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ON mSTORY, TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE, 
AND PAlAZZOLO: A REPLY TO JAMES 
BURUNG 
TIMOTHY J. DOWLING* 
Abstract: The so-called property rights movement has hailed Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island as a landmark win for landowners, a blockbuster 
breakthrough that will end "smart growth," curtail other land use 
controls, and lead to manifold victories for claimants under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. James Burling's piece on Palazzolo is 
more of the same, proclaiming the ruling to be a decisive win in an age-
old, ideological battle. This Article shows that Burling's take on the 
ruling is wishful thinking. He errs in his description of history, takings 
jurisprudence, and Palazzolo. Palazzolo is but a small, incremental 
development in the case law from which both takings claimants and 
defendants may draw support. The Court's most recent takings ruling, 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Ref5ional Planning Agenl)', 
reaffirms that the vast bulk of land use controls and other community 
protections do not implicate the Takings Clause. 
Those who want skill to use those evidences they have of probabilities; who 
cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads; nor weigh exactly the 
preponderanl)' of contrary proofs and testimonies, making every circum-
stance its due allowance; may be easily misled to assent to positions that are 
not probable. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In Private Property Rights and the Environment After Palazzolo,2 
James Burling commits three fundamental errors. He misreads his-
tory, misinterprets takings jurisprudence, and misapprehends the 
* Timothy J. Dowling is Chief Counsel of Community Rights Counsel, a nonprofit pub-
lic interest law firm that represents the interests of municipalities in regulatory takings 
challenges to land-use controls and other community protections. Mr. Dowling prepared 
an amicus brief in Palazzolo tt Rhode Island on behalf of organizations representing the views 
of local officials and planners. For more information on Community Rights Counsel, visit 
www.communityrights.org. 
1 2 JOHN LOCKE, .AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. IV, ch. XX, § 5, 
at 299 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1961) (1690). 
230 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (2002). 
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meaning of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.!l In this reply, I describe his three 
errors in turn. 
Regarding Palazzolo in particular, Burling calls the ruling perhaps 
"the most significant skirmish" in an overarching ideological war.4 He 
concludes that Palazzolo has removed "some of the more pernicious 
governmental defenses to regulatory takings claims" and "injected 
new life in the doctrine of regulatory takings."5 These dramatic char-
acterizations are of a piece with similar assertions by Burling and his 
colleagues at Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) at the time of the rul-
ing, which proclaimed Palazzolo a "landmark victory" for landowners,6 
predicted that smart growth is now "doomed,"? and pontificated that 
"[t]he notice rule is dead, except in what remains of Uustice] Stevens' 
mind. "8 
The reaction to Palazzolo by Burling and his colleagues is plainly 
hyperbolic. As shown below, Palazzolo is not a major jurisprudential 
breakthrough in favor of takings claimants, but instead yet another 
modest, incremental development in takings case law. Indeed, there is 
much good news for government officials in Palazzolo. For instance, 
the ruling emphatically reaffirms the Court's ripeness precedent, 
which largely pays appropriate deference to the role of local officials 
in land-use planning. To be sure, the Palazzolo majority bends over 
backwards to resuscitate a claim that has no business being in court, 
falling victim to a bait-and-switch perpetrated by PLF.9 But it does not, 
as Burling argues, impose new requirements on government officials 
in the land-use negotiation process. lO 
Nor is the so-called notice rule dead. Palazzolo's ruling on the 
timing of a claimant's acquisition of property is quite narrow, reject-
ing only the absolute rule that acquisition prior to enactment of the 
3533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
4 Burling, supra note 2, at 3. 
5 [d. at 62. 
6 Press Release, Pacific Legal Foundation, Pacific Legal Foundation Scores Landmark 
Victory for Private Property Rights Advocates in the U.S. Supreme Court (June 28, 2001), 
availabk at http://pacificlegal.org/press_releases/pr-palazzolo.htm. 
7 Paul Mulshine, Supreme Court Decision Changes a Lot, STAR LEnGER (NJ.) ,July 3, 2001, 
at 21 (quoting Burling as saying that "smart growth is dumb takings" and "incompatible" 
with constitutional protections for property rights) . 
8 This churlish comment was made in aJune 29, 2001 email communication by PLF at-
torney RS. Radford on a public listserv moderated by the State and Local Government 
Section of the American Bar Association (copy on file with author) . 
9 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 646-48 (2001) (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer, 
.IJ., dissenting). 
10 See infra notes 147-155 and accompanying text. 
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challenged regulation always defeats takings liability.ll At least five Jus-
tices agree that the timing of a claimant's acquisition of property is 
relevant to the analysis in most takings cases.12 Moreover, Palazzolo 
clarifies that background principles of law that defeat takings claims 
include not just common law nuisance principles, but also positive 
laws, such as statutes and regulations, in appropriate circumstances.I3 
Palazzolo also unambiguously rejects the argument that per se li-
ability attaches where regulation denies a landowner a reasonable re-
turn on investment. I4 In fairness to Burling, it must be acknowledged 
that Palazzolo contains a brief and thoroughly confused discussion of 
the Court's parcel-as-a-whole rule, but because the Court just recently 
reaffirmed the rule,I5 Palazzolo's vague dicta is not nearly as significant 
as Burling suggests.I6 
I. "THE TRADITIONAL AMERICAN VIEW" OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
Burling begins his article by attempting to cast Palazzolo as part of 
a vast philosophical battle between competing visions of property 
rights. One side of the debate is what Burling calls "the traditional 
American view," a view in which property rights and other individual 
rights are "sacrosanct over the needs of the group. "17 The other side, 
Burling tells us, consists of those who suggest that this purported tra-
ditional view "is an anachronism in this Age of the Environment. "18 
This side of the debate, we are told, consists of new-fangled theorists 
(Professor Joseph Sax receives special mention) who use a riparian 
model to argue for "the adoption of a legal philosophy that would 
make the use and ownership of property subject to common con-
sent. "19 John Locke plays a central role in Burling's version of history, 
11 See infra notes 156-167 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 168-176 and accompanying text. 
U See infra notes 180-185 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 190-197 and accompanying text. 
15 SeeTahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 
1481 (2002) ("[E]ven though multiple factors are relevant in the analysis of regulatory 
takings claims, in such cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.'~); id. at 1483-84. 
16 See infra notes 211-234 and accompanying text. 
17 Burling, supra note 2, at 2. 
18 [d. 
19 See id. at 2, 37, 38 n.226. Burling's description of Sax's work is, to say the least, sim-
plistic. Sax's view of the Takings Clause is indisputably more accommodating of govern-
ment protections in the public interest than Burling's, but Sax's writings do not espouse 
the absolutist philosophy that Burling attributes to him. For example, Sax recommends a 
plethora of government actions designed to reduce the impact of regulation on individual 
landowners, hardly the kind of recommendations one would expect from someone argu-
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for it was Locke who first described property as predating sovereign 
power.20 Because, in Burling's view, the Framers of the Constitution 
were "firmly predisposed" to Locke's philosophy,21 he suggests that "a 
vibrant Lockean tradition" compels an aggressive application of the 
Takings Clause to the regulation of private property in the public in-
terest. 22 
This description of the takings debate is a fairy-tale, for it has the 
relevant history exactly backwards. The "traditional" view of the Tak-
ings Clause-the view shared by the founding generation and the view 
that predominated for the first 130 years of our nation's history-was 
that the Clause does not extend to government regulation at all. The 
founding generation and several succeeding generations understood 
the Takings Clause as applying only to the appropriation or physical 
invasion of property. Justice Antonin Scalia, one of the Court's 
staunchest advocates of property rights, has noted that "early constitu-
tional theorists did not believe that the Takings Clause embraced 
regulations of property at all."23 In the words of Justice Scalia, "[p]rior 
to Justice Holmes's exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393 (1922), it was generally thought that the Takings Clause 
reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property ... or the functional 
equivalent ofa 'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession."'24 
Historical research overwhelmingly supports Justice Scalia's as-
sertions in this regard.25 So do the Court's rulings prior to Mahon. In 
ing that the use and ownership of property is subject to common consent. See Joseph L. 
Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1450-51 (1993). Sax also makes clear that he would "have 
no quarrel" with a rule requiring heightened judicial scrutiny where regulation deprives a 
landowner of all economic value. Id. at 1455. Elsewhere, Sax has argued for the payment of 
compensation to landowners under the Takings Clause where the government imposes 
undue regulatory burdens when acting in an entrepreneurial capacity. See generally Joseph 
L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36 (1964). A full rebuttal of Burling'S 
mischaracterization of Sax's views is beyond the scope of this Article. 
20 See Burling, supra note 2, at 3-5,40,51,62. 
21 Id. at 3. 
22 Id. at 5. 
2' Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992). 
24Id. at 1014 (citations omitted) (last alteration in original). 
25 See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROLS 105-23 (1973) (showing that the Takings 
Clause did not originally apply to land-use controls); William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 782 
(1995) (As originally understood, the Takings Clause "required compensation when the 
federal government physically took property, but not when government regulations lim-
ited the ways in which property could be used. "). 
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the Legal Tender Cases, for instance, the Court explained that "[the 
Takings Clause] has always been understood as referring only to a di-
rect appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from 
the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any 
bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to 
individuals."26 Nor is it correct to suggest that the Framers were uni-
formly, or even predominantly, predisposed to Locke's views on prop-
erty. In fact, the Framers' views on property were very much a mixed 
bag. Benjamin Franklin, one of the few Framers who signed both the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, asserted in une-
quivocal terms that property is created by the State and thus subject to 
extensive state control: 
Private Property therefore is a Creature of Society, and is 
subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities 
shall require it, even to its last Farthing; its Contributions 
therefore to the public Exigencies are not to be considered 
as conferring a Benefit on the Publick, entitling the Con-
tributors to the Distinctions of Honour and Power, but as the 
Return of an Obligation previously received, or the Payment 
of ajust Debt.27 
Franklin's views on property evidence the emerging consensus among 
historians that both republican and liberal ideas, i.e., Lockean as well 
as Hobbesian philosophy and other competing worldviews, had a pro-
found influence on the Framers. Mter a survey of the relevant 
authorities, one scholar recently concluded that "[w]hile historians 
are sharply divided on a host of interpretive matters concerning re-
publicanism and liberalism in the revolutionary era and the first years 
of the early republic, there is now a near consensus that both republi-
can and liberal ideas powerfully influenced American politics during 
the 1780s and 1 790s. "28 
26 The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457,551 (1870); accCffdN. Transp. Co. v. 
City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879) ("[A]cts done in the proper exercise of govern-
mental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their conse-
quences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of 
the constitutional provision."). 
27 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Queries and Remarks Respecting Alterations in the Constitution of 
Pennsylvania (1789), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 59 (Albert H. Smyth ed., 
1970). 
28 Treanor, supra note 25, at 823; see also Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Tak-
ings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REv. 509, 522 (1998) (citing authorities). 
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Moreover, Locke himself believed that private property rights 
could be exercised only ''where there is enough and as good left in 
common for others.''29 In other words, Locke's theory of property 
recognized the right of each person to an equal share of property and 
precluded private acquisitions of property that deprived others of this 
right.30 This severe limitation on the acquisition of property stemmed 
from Locke's view that God originally gave all property to humankind 
to be held in common.31 Although Professor Richard Epstein relies on 
Locke to bolster his call for a breathtakingly expansive application of 
the Takings Clause,32 even Epstein recognizes that this key aspect of 
Locke's philosophy is in severe tension with an aggressive theory of 
regulatory takings.33 Epstein addresses this tension by "correct [ing] " 
Locke and discarding the notion of original ownership in common,34 
a correction that prompted one critic to write that "Locke himself ... 
was insufficiently Lockean" for Epstein.35 Burling, too, would have 
difficulty reconciling Locke's views on property acquisition with a 
broad vision of the Takings Clause, but, unlike Epstein, Burling fails 
to acknowledge the issue. 
Nor is it accurate to suggest that property rights were sacrosanct 
over the needs of the community in colonial America and the early 
years of our Republic. Both eras saw extensive land-use controls, none 
of which were considered to implicate the compensation requirement 
of the Takings Clause.36 For instance, the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
prohibited dwellings from being located more than one-half mile 
29 JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Civil Government§ 27, at 134, in Two TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947) (1690). 
so See id. 
51 Id. §§ 25-27, at 133-34. 
32 See generally RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing for a reading of the Takings Clause and parallel clauses 
that "render[s] infirm or constitutionally suspect many of the heralded reforms and insti-
tutions of the twentieth century: zoning, rent control, workers' compensation laws, trans-
fer payments, progressive taxation"). 
33 Id. at 10-11 (acknowledging that Locke "did consider it a breach of duty for one 
person to take everything from the common pool, to the necessary exclusion of others" 
and "correct[ing]" Locke's account). 
34 Id. at 11. 
35 See Charles Fried, Protecting Praperty-Law and Politics, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 44, 
48-49 (1990). Professor Fried continued: "Professor Epstein is moved to complete not only 
the text of the Constitution by reference to the Lockean spirit, but Locke's text itself." Id. 
For an excellent discussion of the scholarly criticisms of Professor Epstein's reading of the 
Takings Clause, see Kendall & Lord, supra note 28, at 520-28. 
36 See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 
109 HARV. L. REv. 1252, 1257-59 (1996). 
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from town meeting houses without judicial approval.37 Connecticut 
land-use controls limited not only the amount but also the sequence 
of new development, much as modern smart-growth initiatives seek to 
avoid "leapfrog development. "38 These land-use restrictions during 
the colonial era were "so numerous and varied, so widely distributed, 
that they cannot be viewed as anomalous."39 Likewise, during the early 
years of our Republic, American legislatures extensively regulated 
land use. 4O Yet those who push for an expansive application of the 
Takings Clause have unearthed no evidence in the ratification debates 
or other founding documents to suggest that anyone in the founding 
generation contemplated application of the Takings Clause to these 
land-use controls. 
Thus, the traditional view of the Takings Clause supports those 
who call for a restrained application of regulatory takings doctrine. 
The new-fangled theorists in the debate are those who push for a far 
more aggressive application of the Clause to land-use restrictions and 
other community protections. 
II. THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF MODERN REGULATORY 
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
Burling's broad outline of regulatory takings jurisprudence con-
tains both general and specific errors. As a general matter, he asserts 
that "private property owners have been winning the debate before 
the United States Supreme Court"41 and suggests that lower courts are 
beginning to fall into line.42 It is not entirely clear what he means by 
the phrase "winning the debate," but if he intends to suggest that tak-
ings jurisprudence is moving toward his vision of individual property 
rights as preeminent over the public interest, he is thoroughly mis-
taken. 
Just as Burling fails to acknowledge that the narrow original 
meaning of the Takings Clause precluded application of the Clause to 
land-use controls, he does not appreciate how that narrow meaning 
~7 ld. at 1273. 
~ ld. at 1274. 
391d. at 128l. 
40 John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings 
Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1100 (2000) (asserting that land use was extensively regu-
lated "between the time America won its independence and the adoption of the property-
protecting measures of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights"). 
41 Burling, supra note 2, at 64. 
42 Burling, supra note 2, at 4-5,18-19. 
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continues to act as a severe restraint on modern regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, limiting application of the Clause to those rare situa-
tions in which regulation constitutes the functional equivalent of an 
appropriation of property. In the landmark Mahon decision, the Court 
found a taking only because the challenged restraint had "very nearly 
the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or de-
stroying" private property.43 More recently, the Court has stated une-
quivocally that in regulatory takings cases, its task is "to distinguish the 
point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the same 
effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain 
or physical possession."44 Not surprisingly, land-use regulation rarely 
rises to this level.45 In establishing its two per se rules of takings liabil-
ity, the Court used functional equivalency to appropriation as a 
benchmark.46 It described those rules as "very narrow"47 and as apply-
ing in only "extraordinary" circumstances.48 
The recent ruling in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agen~9 confirms these basic precepts and shows 
that property owners are hardly winning any argument to the con-
trary. In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court emphasized the analytical divide be-
tween physical and regulatory takings,50 observing that the distinction 
43 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). One scholar has made a compel-
ling case that MaJwn is not a takings case at all, but a due process case. See generally Robert 
Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of 
justice Holmes's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE LJ. 613 (1996). It is 
indisputable that Mahon is widely viewed as having given birth to the doctrine of regulatory 
takings, and I do not challenge that view here. 
44 Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172, 199(1985). 
45 See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985) (ac-
knowledging that under "extreme circumstances," "land use regulation may ... amount to 
a 'taking'"). 
46 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (regulation that denies 
a landowner all economically viable use may be a per se taking because such land-use con-
trols are "from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation"); 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CAlV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982) (citing San-
guinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924), stating that physical occupations are 
per se takings where they "constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amount-
ing to an appropriation of, and not merely an injury to, the property") (citation omitted). 
47 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441. 
48 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017, 1018 (stating that a per se rule for regulation that denies all 
economically viable use applies only in "relatively rare" situations) . 
49 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002). 
50 Id. at 1478-79. 
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flows directly from the text of the Takings Clause.51 It described regu-
latory takings as occurring where restrictions are "so severe that they 
are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation. "52 And it re-
jected a takings challenge to a thirty-two-month moratorium, stressing 
the importance of carefulland-use planning in protecting our com-
munities from "inefficient and ill-conceived growth. "53 Tahoe-Sierra 
stands as an emphatic reaffirmation that the vast bulk of land-use con-
trols do not trigger the compensation requirement set forth in the 
Takings Clause. 
As for the lower courts, Burling cites six cases to support his sug-
gestion that landowners now are winning the takings debate in the 
courts and reaping substantial judgments in their favor. But all six 
cases involve rulings against the federal government by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, 
or its predecessor, the U.S. Claims Court. 54 This exceedingly narrow 
focus is odd and distortive for three reasons. First, those on both sides 
of the takings debate view these courts as among the most politicized 
tribunals in the country on takings issues.55 Second, these courts have 
no jurisdiction over state and local agencies,56 the institutions that 
impose virtually all of our nation's land-use controls. A review of state 
court rulings in takings cases in recent years shows that state and local 
officials continue to win the vast majority of regulatory takings cases, 
including many cases in which the challenged restriction was substan-
tial. 57 Third, even if one focuses exclusively on takings claims against 
51 [d. at 1478 ('The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a 
distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings. ") . 
52 [d. at 1478 n.17. 
5~ [d. at 1488. 
54 See Burling, supra note 2, at 18-19. 
55 Compare Kendall & Lord, supra note 28, at 533-38 (describing the establishment and 
politicization of these two courts), with James L. Huffman, Jud!J! Pla!J!T's "Sea Chan!J!" in 
Regulatory Takings Law, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 597, 599 (1995) ("[B]ecause the Federal 
Circuit was a new court in 1982, most of its members were appointed during the Reagan 
and Bush Administrations. Thus, there is somewhat more philosophical agreement among 
its members than there is on other Courts of Appeals."), and W. John Moore, Just Compen-
sation, NAT'LJuRlsT,June 13, 1992, at 1406 (quoting the libertarian Institute for justice's 
Clint Bolick as saying, 'The Claims Court is a place where the Reagan and Bush Admini-
strations have been able to place top-notch conservative judges without getting much at-
tention. That is a result of liberals being somewhat asleep at the switch and the Administra-
tion's being extremely sophisticated in their selection and placement of judges."). 
56 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (2001). 
57 See, e.g., Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 
2001) (en banc) (rejecting takings challenge to Washington State's "Interest on Lawyers' 
Trust Account" Program), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2355 (June 10, 2002) (No. 01-1325); Dist. 
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the federal government, from 1991 to 1997 courts found a taking in 
only thirty-one of 230 cases that resulted in a ruling on the merits 
(excluding cases dismissed on standing, ripeness, jurisdictional, or 
other procedural grounds)-hardly cause for celebration among the 
claimants' bar.58 In fact, the so-called property rights movement else-
where has argued that we need federal takings legislation precisely 
because landowners are losing the overwhelming majority of takings 
Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 876-77 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(rejecting takings challenge to historic preservation protections); Stern v. Halligan, 158 
F.3d 729, 734 n.7 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting takings challenge because challenged regula-
tion did not result in Mthe total destruction of value"); Front Royal Be Warren County In-
dus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 286 n.5 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
takings challenge where regulation did not prevent recreational uses of the land such as 
camping or picnicking); San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 89 (Cal. 
2002) (rejecting takings challenge to affordable-housing protections); Animas Valley Sand 
Be Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of La Plata, 38 P.3d 59, 65-66 (Colo. 2001) (en 
bane) (noting that per se takings liability may attach only where land is left valueless or 
with only de minimis value and non-per se liability only where regulation leaves a landowner 
with "value that is slightly greater than de minimis"); State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Burgess, 
772 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting takings challenge to development 
restrictions because land retained recreational uses), review denied, 791 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 615 (2001); Wyer v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 747 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 
2000) (rejecting takings challenge to a variance denial under a sand dune protection law 
due to remaining recreational uses); Karam v. State, 723 A2d 943 (NJ. 1999) (adopting 
the lower court's rejection of a takings challenge under the public trust doctrine), aff'g 705 
A.2d 1221 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); R.W. Docks Be Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 
787-88 (Wis. 2001) (rejecting takings challenge to denial of permission to convert boat 
slips to private, condominium-style ownership, using the public trust doctrine), cert. denied 
sub nom. R. W. Docks Be Slips v. Wisconsin, 122 S. Ct. 617 (2001); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 
548 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Wis. 1996) (rejecting takings challenge to wetland restrictions). 
58 See ROBERT MELTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., COURT RUUNGS DURING 1997 
ON CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 2 (1998). A review of 
last year's rulings from the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims shows that 
they continue to hand property owners many noteworthy defeats in takings cases. E.g., Bay 
View, Inc. v. United States, 278 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting takings challenge to 
amendments to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act), reh'g denied and reh'g en banc 
denied, 285 F.3d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2002), petitWnfur cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3021 (U.S. June 20, 
2002); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding 
that legislation requiring the payment of money cannot give rise to a taking), cert. denied, 
122 S. Ct. 2293 (2002); Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
takings challenge to mining regulations and associated delays), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1960 
(2002); Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (on petition for 
rehearing) (rejecting takings challenge to mining restrictions), cm. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2260 
(2002); Maritrans, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 277 (2001) (rejecting takings challenge 
to restrictions on oil tankers); Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248 (2001) (rejecting 
takings challenge to wetland protections); Banks v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 806 (2001) 
(rejecting takings challenge to federal actions that allegedly eroded claimants' shoreline 
property); Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. CI. 16 (2001) (rejecting takings challenge 
where federal foreign policy sanctions on Libya prohibited the exercise of claimant's stock 
options). 
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cases on procedural grounds. 59 Any suggestion that landowners are 
winning the takings debate in the courts is a victory of PLF's hope 
over reality. 
When Burling turns to the specifics of regulatory takings juris-
prudence, his analysis fares no better. His errors and oversim-
plifications are too numerous to explicate comprehensively, and so 
this reply focuses on two representative examples. 
First, Burling tells us that a compensable taking occurs where 
land-use regulation fails to substantially advance a legitimate public 
interest, citing Agins v. City of Tiburon.60 This substantially-advance 
standard is sometimes referred to as a means-end test because it re-
quires a court to determine whether the legislatively chosen means 
adequately advance a legitimate end. In discussing this standard, 
Burling fails altogether to note that in recent years, five U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices expressly disavowed the Agins means-end test as an ap-
propriate standard of takings liability,61 and every other member of 
the Court has written or joined opinions at least questioning its con-
tinued role in takings jurisprudence.62 
Second, Burling tells us that under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Counci~ 63 a taking occurs where regulation denies all economically 
59 SeeJohn Delaney & Duane Desiderio, Who Will Crean Up the "Ripeness Mess"? A Callfar 
Refarm So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAw. 195, 196 (1999) 
(arguing that courts dismiss the vast majority of takings claims on procedural grounds) . 
60 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
61 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, j., concurring in the 
judgment, dissenting in part) (observing that the Agins means-end test "is in uneasy ten-
sion with our basic understanding of the Takings Clause" and concluding that "the more 
appropriate constitutional analysis [for a means-end inquiry] arises under general due 
process principles rather than under the Takings Clause"); id. at 554 (Breyer, Stevens, 
Souter & Ginsburg, lJ., dissenting) (concluding that "the plurality views [the means-end 
inquiry in] this case through the wrong legal lens" because "at the heart of the [Takings] 
Clause lies a concern, not with preventing arbitrary or unfair government action, but with 
providing compensation for legitimate government action that takes 'private property' to 
serve the 'public' good"). 
62 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999) 
(acknowledging that the Court has never given "a thorough explanation of the nature or 
applicability" of the Agins means-end test, but declining to revisit the test because the city 
failed to challenge the standard in the lower courts); id. at 732 n.2 (Scalia,j., concurring 
in part, concurring in the judgment) ("express[ing] no view" as to the propriety of the 
Agins means-end test as a standard of takings liability); id. at 753 n.12 (Souter, O'Connor, 
Ginsburg & Breyer,lJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (offering no opinion as to 
"whether Agins was correct in assuming that this prong of liability was properly cognizable 
as flowing from the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as distinct from 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments"). 
6~ 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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viable use of land unless it "merely codifies the existing 'common law 
nuisance' limitations on property. "64 Here, Burling is referring to 
what the Lucas Court called the background-principles inquiry. The 
Lucas majority explained that no taking occurs where background 
principles of law "show[] that the proscribed use interests were not 
part of [the claimant's] title to begin with. "65 In other words, the 
claimant does not possess the property interest alleged to have been 
taken because the constraint "inhere[s] in the title itself, in the re-
strictions that background principles of the State's law of property 
and nuisance already place upon land ownership."66 Ever since Lucas, 
PLF and others who represent takings claimants have striven mightily 
to confine the background-principles inquiry to common law nui-
sance.67 On this view, neither positive laws such as statutes and regula-
tions nor non-nuisance common law doctrines, such as the public 
trust doctrine,68 may constitute background principles that defeat tak-
ings liability. 
This crabbed view of the background-principles defense is plainly 
contradicted by Lucas and other authorities.69 Lucas describes back-
ground principles no less than four times as embracing not only nui-
sance law, but the full range of state property law.7o Most of Lucas's 
references to state property law are unqualified, i.e., without regard to 
whether that law is embodied in common law or statute.71 And Lucas 
specifically discusses a non-nuisance doctrine, the navigational servi-
tude, as an example of a background principle that defeats takings 
64 Burling, supra note 2, at 13 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1029-30 (1992». 
65 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
66 [d. at 1029. 
67 E.g., Eric Grant, Taking Scalia Seriously: A Conservative View of the Lucas "Background 
Principles" Exception, 1 (paper delivered at the Oct. 28-29, 1999 Georgetown University Law 
Center Conference on Litigating Regulatory Takings Claims) (on file with author) 
("[B]ackground principles are a static category of essentially nineteenth-century rules that 
prohibit landowners from imposing direct harm on the real and personal property of oth-
ers, usually their neighbors. H); see Burling, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
68 See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970). 
69 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029; see also, e.g., Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d 
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001), reh'g denied and reh'g en banc denied, 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2660 (2002); Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 
2001). 
70 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029, 1030, 1031 (referring to the "background principles of 
the State's law of property and nuisance"). 
71 [d. 
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liability.72 Moreover, in noting that property interests generally are 
defined by state law, Lucas relies on Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth,73 which recognized that state statutes, rules, and other sources of 
state law define property interests.74 Thus, Lucas provides strong sup-
port for the argument that the background-principles defense ex-
tends beyond common law nuisance, and lower courts have been 
quite expansive in their application of the defense to statutes, regula-
tions, and non-nuisance common-law doctrines.75 As discussed below, 
Palazzolo resolves any ambiguity by confirming that background prin-
ciples may include statutes, regulations, and the full range of common 
law doctrines in appropriate circumstances.76 
III. PALAZZOLO: GoOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS FOR STATE 
AND LOCAL OFFICIALS 
A. The Facts and Equities 
Although my principal quarrels with Burling'S account of Palaz-
zolo concern the legal effect of the ruling, before turning to those dis-
agreements it is important to clarity three factual nuances that color 
the equities of the case. First, Burling tells us that the property near 
Palazzolo's site has been developed with homes.77 The discussion ap-
pears designed to suggest that the State unfairly singled out Palazzolo 
for development restrictions while allowing others to build.78 Al-
though there are houses in the general vicinity, no one on Winnapaug 
Pond has been permitted to destroy wetlands on the scale desired by 
Palazzolo. The key question is not whether others have built houses in 
the area, but whether they have done so on similar terrain on the 
scale proposed by Palazzolo. Palazzolo proposed to fill all eighteen 
72 [d. at 1028-29. 
"408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
74 [d. at 577-78. 
75 See, e.g., DOUGLAS T. KENDALL, TIMOTHY J. DOWLING & ANDREW W. SCHWARTZ, TAK-
INGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK 130-43 (2002). See gmerally Glenn Sugameli, Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other ''Exceptions'' to Liability for Fifth Amend-
ment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the "RulR, .. 29 ENVTL. L. 939 (1999). 
76 Even the Justices most inclined to rule in favor of takings claimants acknowledge 
that statutes and other positive laws may constitute background principles of law that pre-
clude takings claims. See Tahoe-Sierm, 122 S. Ct. at 1494-95 (Rehnquist, CJ., Scalia & Tho-
mas,1J., dissenting) (noting that zoning regulations and state statutes governing moratoria 
may constitute background principles under Lucas). 
77 Burling, supra note 2, at 6. 
78 See id. 
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acres of intertidal wetlands on his property to build a seventy-four 
house subdivision.79 As shown in the photo below,80 the south (ocean-
side) shore of Win nap aug Pond remains largely undeveloped, and the 
existing houses are concentrated on the ridge of uplands along the 
road between the beach and the marsh.81 
The salt marshes along the pond are largely unbuildable because 
the soil is unsuitable for sanitary facilities, the compressible nature of 
the mucky peat is ill-suited for permanent structures, and the devel-
opment costs would be extraordinary.82 In this regard, Palazzolo 
stands in stark contrast to the landowner in Lucas, who proposed to 
do to his property precisely what his immediately adjacent neighbors 
had done to their property.811 
79 Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 714 (R.I. 2000), afJ'd in part, reu'd in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
80 The Rhode Island Attorney General's Office provided this photograph to the 
author. 
81 See Testimony of Grover Fugate, Coastal Resources Management Council Director, 
Trial Transcript at 187, Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, No. CA. 88-0297 (R.I. 
Super. Ct.June 18, 1997) (noting that development on the south side of Win nap aug Pond 
is confined to the upland portion) [hereinafter Trail Transcript]. 
82 See State's Memorandum Regarding Remand at 10-11, Palazzolo v. State, (No. 98-
333-A) (citing record evidence) [hereinafter State's Memorandum]. 
lIS Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992). 
2002] History, Takings Jurisprudence, and Palazzolo 79 
Second, Burling asserts that Palazzolo intended to fill 11.4 acres 
of wetlands to build a "family beach recreational area" on the site.84 
Although Palazzolo's 1985 application to fill the land set forth this 
proposal, Palazzolo's takings claim as litigated had nothing to do with 
the proposed beach club.85 At the heart of the case as tried in state 
court was Palazzolo's desire to destroy all eighteen acres of wetlands 
on the site to build a seventy-four-home subdivision.86 In his opening 
statement to the trial court, Palazzolo's attorney referred to the pro-
posed development as "need[ing] fill to be able to construct 
homes. "87 Palazzolo's valuation evidence was based exclusively on the 
subdivision plan,88 and the record is silent as to the economic viability 
of the beach club. Following Palazzolo's lead, the state trial court and 
state supreme court naturally found that his takings claim was rooted 
in his proposal to destroy all eighteen acres of wetlands to build a 
subdivision, and they resolved the case on this basis.89 In seeking re-
view by the U.S. Supreme Court, Palazzolo cited these very rulings to 
emphasize that his claim is based on the State's denial of permission 
to destroy all eighteen acres ofwetlands.90 
One might legitimately question whether Palazzolo ever intended 
to build a beach club on the property. As noted by Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Court, "[t]he details [of the proposed beach club] do 
not tend to inspire the reader with an idyllic coastal image. ''91 Justice 
Ginsburg was less forgiving, calling the proposal "most disagreeable" 
and noting that "to get to the club's water, i.e., Winnapaug Pond 
rather than the nearby Atlantic Ocean, 'you'd have to ... work your 
84 Burling, supra note 2, at 8. 
85 See Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 709-11 (R.I. 2000), afl'd in part, 
rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
86 [d. 
87 Opening Statement of John Webster, Counsel for Plaintiff, Trial Transcript, supra 
note 81, at 12. 
88 Joint Lodging tab 7, at 14, 17, 24, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) 
(No. 99-2047). 
89 See Tavares, 746 A.2d at 714; Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, CA. No. 88-
0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. 
Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, re-
. manded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
90 Petitioner's Reply Brief, 2001 WL 57593, at *5-6, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606 (2001) (No. 99-2047). 
91 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 615 (2001) (noting that the so-called beach 
club proposal was for a parking lot, port-ajohns, trash cans, picnic tables, and concrete 
barbecue pits). 
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way through approximately 70, 75 feet of marshland or conservation 
grasses. ' "92 
Mter having litigated his claim based on the subdivision pro-
posal, Palazzolo switched gears in the V.S. Supreme Court and argued 
instead that the takings claim is rooted in the beach club proposal. 
Evidently, Palazzolo was concerned that his failure to apply for per-
mission to build a subdivision might sink his claim as unripe, as it had 
in the state supreme court.9!l The State understandably argued that 
courts should prohibit such "sandbagging" by landowners who submit 
one land-use proposal and then use the denial as the basis for a tak-
ings claim based on a much more extravagant proposal.94 As discussed 
below, the V.S. Supreme Court ruled that while federal ripeness law 
did not prevent him from doing so, States may design their land-use 
processes to preclude this kind of chicanery.95 
Third, Burling fails to mention that the trial court found that 
Palazzolo's proposed destruction of eighteen acres of wetlands, which 
constitute twelve percent of the existing salt marsh around Winna-
paug Pond, would constitute a public nuisance.96 The proposed wet-
land destruction would reduce the ability of the salt marsh to filter 
out harmful pollutants, resulting in higher levels of nitrates in the 
groundwater, which is the sole source of drinking water for the sur-
rounding community.97 Moreover, the proposed fill would 
significantly reduce commercial and recreational shellfish and finfish 
populations.98 Based on these facts, the trial court found that the pro-
posed fill would be a public nuisance because it would "not be suit-
able for the locality of the subject property. "99 The state supreme 
court did not rely on the nuisance finding to support its rejection of 
Palazzolo's takings claim,lOO and thus the U.S. Supreme Court had no 
occasion to refer to it. Nevertheless, the finding might well prove to 
92 [d. at 647 n.l (quoting trial transcript testimony). 
95 See Tavares, 746A.2d at 714. 
94 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 624. 
95 See infra notes 150-151 and accompanying text. 
96 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *5 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), aff'd on other gruunds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex reI. Ta-
vares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. 




100 Tavares, 746A.2d at 713-17. 
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be dispositive in the remand proceedings, and it certainly colors the 
equities of the case.101 
B. The Palazzolo Ruling on Ripeness 
The state supreme court ruled that Palazzolo's takings claim is 
unripe for two reasons. First, the court concluded that the record 
failed to show the extent to which the State would permit develop-
ment on the property because Palazzolo failed to apply for permission 
to use the land in ways that would involve filling substantially less wet-
lands or building only on the upland portion.102 Second, the court 
relied on Palazzolo's failure to submit even one application for the 
seventy-four-home subdivision proposal that formed the heart of his 
claim as litigated in state court.103 
The broader implications of the ripeness issue in Palazzolo may be 
best understood by examining existing ripeness precedent as well as 
the debate that took place during the consideration of federal ripe-
ness legislation in the l05th Congress. 
Under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton 
Bank of Johnson City,l04 a takings challenge to a land-use regulation is 
not ripe until the government has reached a final decision regarding 
the application of the regulation to the claimant's property.105 Obtain-
ing a final decision might require the landowner to seek a variance or 
waiver from an initial determination.106 In McDonald, Sommer & Frates 
v. County ofYolo,lo7 the Court made clear that it also might well require 
the landowner to submit multiple applications because the rejection 
of one development plan does not necessarily mean that the govern-
101 See State's Memorandum, supra note 82, at 7-15 & Addendum I. The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court recently remanded the case to the trial court for further findings on sev-
eral issues, including the nuisance issue. See Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 785 A.2d 561, 
561 (R.1. 2001) (order remanding the case to the superior court and directing counsel to 
submit further memoranda). 
102 Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 714 (R.I. 2000), afl'd in part, rev'd in 
part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
103 ld. 
104 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
105 ld. at 186; accord Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (ruling that a 
takings claim is unripe where the claimant fails to submit a development application). 
106 See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981) 
(holding that a takings claim was unripe where the owner failed to seek a variance or 
waiver). 
107 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
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ment will not permit less intensive development of the property. lOB In 
other words, a takings claim is unripe where there remains "the po-
tential for ... administrative solutions" to the dispute. l OO A takings 
claim ripens only when the record from the land-use negotiations re-
veals "the nature and extent of permitted development. "110 
This ripeness requirement flows from the very nature of the tak-
ings inquiry. Under Mahon, a regulation becomes a taking where it 
"goes too far,"lll but a court cannot determine whether regulation 
goes too far until it knows how far the regulation goes.1l2 Ripeness 
rules also stem from the flexibility and discretion of local agencies in 
addressing land-use issues,113 and the reluctance of courts to second-
guess local land-use agencies.1I4 A landowner need not continue to 
pursue relief from the local land-use agency, however, where the rec-
ord makes clear that doing so would be futile.ll5 
The national developers' lobby, the National Association of 
Home Builders (NAHB), does not like existing ripeness doctrine, and 
in the 105th Congress, NAHB drafted and lobbied for a bill that 
would have changed ripeness rules dramatically.1I6 The Private Prop-
erty Rights Implementation Act of 1997 was designed to authorize de-
velopers and other landowners to file takings claims in federal court 
108 [d. at 353 n.9 (finding that a rejection of application to build 159 homes on claim-
ant's land did not ripen takings claim). 
109 Williamson Cmtnty, 473 U.S. at 187; accord MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 352 (holding that a 
takings claim is unripe where the government's action "leave[s] open the possibility that 
some development will be permitted."). 
110 MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 351; accord Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 
725,738 (1997) (holding that a takings claim is unripe unless the agency has no further 
discretion to allow additional development). 
III Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
112 Suitum, 520 U.S. at 734 (citing MacDonald and Mahon). 
113 [d. at 738 (noting local agencies' "high degree of discretion," and observing that 
they are "singularly flexible institutions") (quoting MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350). 
114 Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191 (observing that a takings claim "simply cannot be 
evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regard-
ing how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question"). 
115 MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7 (noting that a landowner need not resort to unfair 
procedures to obtain a final decision); Landmark Land Co. of Okla. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 
717,721 (10th Cir. 1989) (discussing the futility exception to the ripeness requirement); 
Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir. 1988) (ruling that a 
landowner need not pursue additional local processes where doing so would be an "idle 
and futile act") (quoting Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1146 n.2 
(9th Cir. 1983). 
116 See Glenn P. Sugameli, "Takings" Bills Threaten People, Property, Zoning, and the Envi-
ronment, 31 URB. LAw. 177, 177-84 (1999) (describing NAHB's role in drafting and lobby-
ing for the bill, including $173,000 in NAHB campaign contributions made the day after 
the Judiciary Subcommittee held the first hearing on the bill in the House). 
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without pursuing available opportunities to resolve land-use conflicts 
at the local level.l17 Deemed a "hammer to the head" of state and lo-
cal officials by NAHB's chief 10bbyist,l1S the bill would have radically 
shifted the balance of power in land-use negotiations to developers by 
allowing them to threaten a federal court lawsuit far earlier in the 
land-use planning process.119 
Among other things, the bill would have required local officials 
to specify the permitted intensity of development after the denial of a 
single application.l20 Failure to do so would have allowed the land-
owner to proceed immediately to federal court without continuing to 
pursue available local processes.121 In other words, a landowner could 
file a single, extravagant land-use proposal, and upon denial the bur-
den would shift to local officials to determine precisely how the prop-
erty would be used. Local officials objected to this provision because it 
would have imposed costly and unwarranted new burdens.122 
Virtually every national organization that represents state and 
local officials opposed the bill.12~ So too did federal cabinet-level 
officials, federal judges, state judges, planners, religious groups, labor 
groups, environmental groups, and various other groups, largely due 
to concerns that developers already dominate the land-use planning 
process in many communities, and that a further across-the-board 
shift of power to them would come at the expense of neighboring 
property owners and the public interest.124 Due to the tremendous 
117 H.R. 1534, 105th Congo § 2 (1997). In addition to allowing developers to bypass lo-
cal land-use procedures, the bill purported to authorize them to file immediately in fed-
eral court, without seeking compensation in state court first, as required by Williamson 
County. See id.; if. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195 ("[A] property owner has not suffered 
a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully attempted 
to obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the State .... "). Palazzolo 
did not implicate this aspect of Williamson County or the ripeness debate because Palazzolo 
filed his claim in state court. 
118 Brody Mullins, Property Takings Bill Set For House Fight, CONGRESsDAILyAM, Mar. 14, 
2000, avai/Qbk at http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/ congressdaily. 
119 S. REp. No. 105-242, at 32, 43-44 (1998). 
120 H.R. 1534 § 2; S. REp. No. 105-242, at 38. 
121 HR 1534 § 2; S. REp. No. 105-242, at 38. 
1ft SeeS. REp. No. 105-242, at 44,56-57. 
l2! H.R. REp. No. 105-323, at 23-25 (1997) (dissenting views) (describing the opposi-
tion by forty Attorneys General, the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the International Municipal Law-
yers Association, and other state and local groups) . 
124 S. REp. No. 105-242, at 55-57 (minority views) (listing the many organizations that 
opposed the bill). The Senate Report on the bill notes that while the top four residential 
developers in the nation have revenues exceeding $1 billion per year, ninety percent of 
cities and towns in the country have less than 10,000 people and cannot afford even one 
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opposition to the bill, it never went to the Senate floor for a vote.125 
Undeterred, NAHB filed an amicus brief in Palazzolo asking the Court 
to abandon its existing ripeness doctrine and adopt rules that were in 
great part similar to its failed legislative agenda.126 
The Palazzolo Court rejected this request. The Court reversed the 
state supreme court and ruled that Palazzolo's case was ripe, but in so 
ruling it emphatically reaffirmed its existing ripeness doctrine as set 
forth in Williamson County, MacDonald, and other leading ripeness 
precedents.127 In particular, the Court stressed that a takings claim is 
not ripe "until a court knows 'the extent of permitted development' 
on the land in question "128 at least to a "reasonable degree of cer-
tainty. "129 The Court continued to recognize the critical role of local 
land-use officials in the planning process by confirming "the impor-
tant principle that a landowner may not establish a taking before a 
land-use authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable pro-
cedures, to decide and explain the reach of a challenged regula-
tion. "130 The Court emphasized the need to allow local officials "to 
exercise their full discretion," including procedures that allow for 
variances and waivers.131 
The specific ripeness ruling is tied to the facts of the case and is 
thus unlikely to have much precedential effect adverse to government 
officials. The Court held that the case is ripe because the record 
shows the extent of permitted development on the property: one sin-
gle-family home.132 In this regard, the Court emphasized that the ap-
plicable regulation unequivocally banned Palazzolo from filling the 
wetlands on the property.133 Although the State contended that Palaz-
full-time municipal attorney. Id. at 44-45. These cities and towns can ill-afford the threat of 
lawsuits by large corporate developers. Id. 
125 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)described the bill as one of the most "arrogantly spe-
cial interest" bills he had ever seen and declared that it "wouldn't pass the smell test in any 
town in America," Sugameli, supra note 116, at 180 (quoting Nathan Arbitman, Takings 
Proponents at It Again-Devewper Bill Passes House; Action Moves to Senate, ENVIROACTION 
(Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n), Feb. 1998, at 11,13. 
126 Brief of the National Association of Home Builders as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
the Petitioner. 2000 WL 1742027, at *14-28, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 
(2001) (No. 99-2047). 
127 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618-26 (2001). 
128Id. at 618 (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 
351 (1986». 
129 Id. at 620. 
uo Id. 
mId. at 620-21. 
152 Id. at 618-26. 
m Pa!azzolc, 533 U.S. at 618-26. 
2002] Histury, Takings Jurisprudence, and Palazzolo 85 
zolo might be able to build more than one house on the upland por-
tion of the site, the Court held that the State waived this argument by 
failing to contest Palazzolo's assertion to the contrary in its opposition 
to Palazzolo's petition for certiorari.154 By limiting its ripeness ruling to 
"this circumstance,"155 the Court provided an easy basis for govern-
ment officials to distinguish Palau.olo in future cases. 
The Palau.olo Court went on to indicate that in its view there was 
no genuine ambiguity in the record regarding the extent of permitted 
development on the uplands,156 but in a dissent joined by Justices 
Souter and Breyer, Justice Ginsburg took issue with this conclusion.m 
Noting that Palazzolo pursued only a Lucas per se claim in state court, 
she observed that the State had no incentive to flesh out the full ex-
tent of permitted development.I58 In her view, the State's submissions 
establish only a floor, not a ceiling, on permissible development.159 
In a highly unusual condemnation of Supreme Court counsel, 
Justice Ginsburg showed that PLF changed the nature of Palazzolo's 
claim from a per se claim under Lucas to a non-per se claim, thereby 
elevating the significance of whether he could build more than one 
house, and then misrepresented the record regarding the extent of 
permissible development.l40 Responding to the m~ority's conclusion 
that it was now too late for the State to suggest that additional devel-
opment might be allowed because it failed to raise this possibility in its 
opposition to certiorari, Justice Ginsburg observed that the Court's rul-
ing "amounts to an unsavory invitation to unscrupulous litigants: 
Change your theory and misrepresent the record in your petition for 
certiorari; if the respondent fails to note your machinations, you have 
created a different record on which this Court will review the case. "141 
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the record was ambiguous on this 
issue because Palazzolo never submitted a survey of his land, and she 
argued against "step [ping] into the role of supreme topographical 
fact finder to resolve ambiguities in Palazzolo's favor. "142 
1~4 Id. at 622 (explaining that the State's argument in this regard "comes too late in the 
day"). 
155 Id. at 622. 
156 Id. at 623. 
mId. at 652-54 (Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer,jJ., dissenting). 
us Id. at 648-49 (Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer,jJ., dissenting). 
159 See Palnzzolo, 533 U.S. at 651-52 (Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer,jJ., dissenting). 
140 See id. at 648 (Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer,jJ., dissenting). 
141 Id. at 653 (Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer,jJ., dissenting). 
142Id. at 654 (Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer,jJ., dissenting). 
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With respect to the state supreme court's second ripeness 
ground-Palazzolo's failure to submit an application for the seventy-
four-home subdivision proposal-the Court ruled that his failure went 
only to damages, not to ripeness under the federal Constitution.143 
Because the extent of permitted development was (in the Court's 
view) manifest, further applications would not provide additional 
clarification that would assist the ripeness inquiry.l44 In good news for 
state and local government officials, however, the Court recognized 
the State's "valid concern" that a landowner might attempt to use a 
hide-the-ball strategy by applying for a modest proposal and then us-
ing a denial as the basis for a takings claim for an exorbitant sum 
based on a much more extensive proposaI.l45 Although federal ripe-
ness rules do not preclude this abuse, the Court made clear that state 
ripeness rules may do so, stating that it did "not intend to cast doubt" 
on local planning procedures and state ripeness rules designed to 
prevent takings claims based on hypothetical uses that would not pass 
muster under locallaw,146 
Notwithstanding the Court's clear reaffirmation of its existing 
ripeness precedent, Burling tells us that perhaps the most significant 
aspect of Palazzolo's ruling on ripeness is that once the government 
denies a single permit application, the denial shifts the burden to the 
government to indicate what other uses are available to the land-
owner.147 This, of course, is exactly what the developers' lobby wanted 
to accomplish through its now-moribund federal ripeness legisla-
tion. l48 Palazzolo does nothing of the sort. 
As support, Burling first quotes the Court as saying that before a 
claim is ripe, a local land-use agency must have "the opportunity, us-
ing its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of 
a challenged regulation. "149 The quoted language says exactly the op-
posite of what Burling would like it to say, making clear that local 
officials may use the full range of local procedures to flesh out the 
extent of permitted development. The very next sentence notes the 
importance of allowing local officials to exercise "their full discretion" 
14S [d. at 608. 
144 [d. 
145 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 625. 
146 See id. 
147 Burling, supra note 2, at 23. 
146 See supra notes 117-127 and accompanying text. 
149 Burling, supra note 2, at 23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606) (emphasis re-
moved). 
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and permitting local procedures for variances, waiver, and the like to 
play out before landowners may proceed to court 150 Burling also cites 
to the Court's assertion that there was no indication that the State 
would have approved a development application to fill less than 11.4 
acres,l5l and the observation that "there is no indication that any use 
involving any substantial structures or improvements would have been 
allowed. "152 The Court's point here, however, is not that government 
officials have the burden to specify permitted development upon the 
denial of a single application, but rather that the unambiguous nature 
of the wetland regulations plainly ruled out any such approval.15S If 
the wetland rules had not been unequivocal, there is little doubt from 
the ruling that the Court would have found the case to be unripe un-
til the extent of permitted fill could be determined,154 It is wishful 
thinking by Burling to infer the establishment of a significant new 
burden on local governments in the planning process from a ruling 
that so plainly reaffirms the core of the Court's existing ripeness 
precedent. 155 
C. The Palazzolo Ruling on Expectations and Background Principles 
In the wake of Palazzolo, PLF declared "dead" what Burling calls 
the notice rule. l56 With apologies to Mark Twain, rumors of the notice 
150 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620-21. 
151 Burling, supra note 2, at 23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 625). 
152Id. 
155 See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 607 (emphasizing the "unequivocal nature of the wetland 
regulations"); id. at 625 (emphasizing that "the limitations the wetland regulations im-
posed were clear"). 
154 See id. at 623-26. 
155 In describing finality ripeness, Burling refers to what he calls "the one meaningful 
application standard," a term that suggests that a takings claim is ripe upon the disposition 
of a single application. Burling, supra note 2, at 25-26. There is no such standard. Al-
though courts have held that a takings claim is unripe until the landowner files at least one 
meaningful application, no court has held that a takings claim is ripe once a single appli-
cation is denied. E.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 405 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (noting that in order to satisfy WiUiamson County Regional Plnnning Commission u 
Hamilion Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), a takings claimant "must submitto local 
decision-makers at least one meaningful application for a development project and a vari-
ance"); Southview Assocs., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1992) (claim un-
ripe where application denial did not preclude approval of modified application); Gilbert 
v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 61 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[T]he filing of one meaningful ap-
plication will ordinarily be a necessary, although not alone sufficient, precondition for 
invoking the futility exception [to the finality ripeness requirement]."); see also Unity Ven-
tures v. Lake County, 841 F.2d 770, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1988). 
156 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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rule's death have been greatly exaggerated.157 The Court's ruling re-
garding the relevance of the timing of a claimant's acquisition vis-a-vis 
the enactment of the challenged regulation is very narrow. 
The Palazzolo Court viewed the state supreme court's ruling as 
having established a "sweeping" and "blanket rule" that acquisition of 
title after enactment of the challenged regulation automatically bars a 
takings claim in every case,158 The Court rejected this rule of per se 
non-liability as "too blunt an instrument,"159 stating that "[t]he State 
may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle" of 
property rights.1oo The Court concluded that precluding all post-
enactment purchasers from prevailing on a takings claim would im-
properly "put an expiration date on the Takings Clause."161 "Future 
generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations 
on the use and value of land," the Court wrote.162 The Court ex-
pressed concern that the process of ripening a claim might prevent 
the owner at the time of enactment from bringing a claim,163 Moreo-
ver, a blanket rule against recovery would create unfair results for 
older property owners and those who need to sell, as opposed to 
those with the resources to hold title,164 
In so ruling, the Court noted that Palazzolo acquired the land 
personally by operation of state law upon dissolution of his corpora-
tion.165 It is not an ideal posture for a government defendant to argue 
that the pre-transfer existence of the challenged law precludes liabil-
ity. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor in con-
currence, and Justice Breyer in dissent all mention inheritance as an-
other kind of transfer that should not always preclude challenge to a 
pre-existing law.166 In these circumstances, it might be difficult to ar-
157 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627-28. 
158 Id. at 628. 
159Id. 
160 Id. at 627. 
161Id. 
162Id. 
16S Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627. 
164 Id. at 628. 
165 Id. at 625. 
166 Id. at 627 (observing that under the proposed blanket rule, "the right to compensa-
tion may not be asserted by an heir or successor"); id. at 635 (O'Connor, j., concurring) 
("We also have never held that a takings claim is defeated simply on account of the lack of 
a personal financial investment by a postenactment acquirer of property, such as a donee, 
heir, or devisee."); id. at 654-55 (Breyer, j., dissenting) ("[T] he simple fact that a piece of 
property has changed hands (for example, by inheritance) does not always and automati-
cally bar a takings claim. "). 
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gue that the transfer greatly changes anyone's expectations about the 
property. On the other hand, acquisition of title by purchase often 
affects reasonable expectations associated with property, particularly 
where the purchase price is discounted due to laws in effect at the 
time of the transfer.167 
In fact, five Justices made clear that post-enactment purchase re-
mains relevant to non-per se claims brought under the multi-factor 
test of liability set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York,l68 the test that governs the vast bulk of regulatory takings 
claims. 169 Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence specifically 
to emphasize that the timing of a takings claimant's acquisition is 
relevant to the Penn Central analysis, stating: "[I]t would be just as 
much error to expunge this consideration from the takings inquiry as 
it would be to accord it exclusive significance."170 The regulatory re-
gime in place at the time of acquisition "helps to shape the reason-
ableness of [the claimant's] expectations" under Penn Central.m She 
expressed concern that "if existing regulations do nothing to inform 
the analysis, then some property owners may reap windfalls and an 
important indicium of fairness is lost. "172 In other words, where a 
buyer purchases land at a discount due to restrictions in place at the 
time of purchase, courts should consider those reduced expectations 
(as reflected in the reduced purchase price) in evaluating a takings 
challenge to those restrictions. Significantly, all four dissenters ex-
167 E.g., Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (takings recoveries 
should be limited to landowners who bought their property in reliance on a regulatory 
scheme that excluded the challenged regulation); Leonard v. Town of Brimfield, 666 
N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (Mass. 1996) (rejecting a takings challenge to flood plain development 
restrictions in place when the claimant bought the land due to her constructive notice of 
the controls). The Federal Circuit in Loveladies Harbur; Inc. v. United States stated: 
In legal terms, the owner who bought with knowledge of the restraint could 
be said to have no reliance interest, or to have assumed the risk of any eco-
nomic loss. In economic terms, it could be said that the market had already 
discounted for the restraint, so that a purchaser could not show a loss in his 
investment attributable to it. 
28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
168 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978) (ruling that takings claims should be considered byana-
lyzing the economic impact on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation inter-
feres with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government 
action). 
169 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992) (stating that the 
per se rule in regulatory takings cases applies only in "extraordinary" circumstances) . 
170 Pal=olo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
171 Id. (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
172Id. at 635 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
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pressly agreed with Justice O'Connor regarding the relevance of the 
timing of acquisition to the Penn Central analysis.173 At least one com-
mentator argues that expectations are relevant even to a per se claim 
under Lucas.J74 
In a typically biting separate opinion, Justice Scalia took issue 
with Justice O'Connor's approach and argued that the timing of ac-
quisition is never relevant to takings analysis unless the pre-existing 
regulation constitutes part of the background principles of law that 
preclude a taking.175 But because no other member of the Court 
joined Justice Scalia's opinion, it is clear that Justice O'Connor has a 
controlling majority that will treat the timing of the claimant's acquisi-
tion as relevant to most takings claims.176 
The Palazzolo Court cites NolZan v. California Coastal Commission177 
as "controlling precedent" for its ruling.178 In Nollan, the Court found 
a taking where the State conditioned a development permit on a 
compelled dedication of lateral beach access, even though the claim-
ants acquired the land after the State had announced its policy to re-
quire such dedications.179 Although Nollan served as a counterexam-
ple to the sweeping, blanket rule of non-liability rejected by the 
Court, it provides little guidance for future cases since it addressed 
acquisition after the adoption of a policy, not a regulation or statute. 
As noted above, a majority of the Justices joined Justice O'Connor in 
declining to view NolZan as precluding consideration of the timing of a 
claimant's acquisition in most takings cases. 
In a portion of Palazzolo largely ignored by Burling, the Court 
clarified that background principles of law under Lucas are not lim-
175 Id. at 643 n.6, 644-45 (Stevens,]., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (agreeing 
that notice of a regulation at the time of purchase is relevant to the takings inquiry); id. at 
654 n.3 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer, lJ., dissenting) (citing separate opinions of Justices 
O'Connor, Stevens, and Breyer,Justice Ginsburg states that "at a minimum, ... transfer of 
title can impair a takings claim"); id. at 654-55 (Breyer,]., dissenting) (agreeing with Jus-
tice O'Connor that the timing of a claimant's acquisition remains relevant to takings analy-
sis) . 
174 See John D. Echeverria, A Preliminary Assessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31 
ENVTL. L. REp. 11,112, 11,118-19 (2001). 
175 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
176 See id. at 633 (O'Connor,]., concurring); id. at 643 n.6, 644-45 (Stevens,]., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part); id. 654 n.3 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer,lJ., dissenting); id. 
at 654-55 (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
177 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
178 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629. 
179 Nolkln, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2 ("[T]he prior owners must be understood to have trans-
ferred their full property rights in conveying the lot."). 
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ited to common law.180 Although not every pre-existing law is "trans-
formed into a background principle of the State's law by mere virtue 
of the passage of title, "181 the Court went so far as to suggest that the 
very Rhode Island statute before it might be a background principle, 
stating: "We have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances 
when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle 
of state law or whether those circumstances are presented here. "182 
The Court described background principles "in terms of those com-
mon, shared understandings of permissible limitations derived from a 
State's legal tradition."183 This "derived from" language-perhaps the 
two most important words in the opinion-strongly suggests that 
background principles include not only pre-existing statutes and regu-
lations that codifY common law doctrines of nuisance and property 
law, but also those that represent a reasonable extension of those doc-
trines.184 Lower courts undoubtedly will be called upon to apply this 
"derived from" standard in future cases where government officials 
argue that a pre-existing statute or regulation constitutes a back-
ground principle of law. 185 
Finally, Burling suggests that no background principle of law 
prohibits the proposed destruction of the intertidal salt marsh, citing 
"centuries of tradition wherein landowners freely reclaimed tide-
lands. "186 In fact, Rhode Island's public trust doctrine appears to pre-
vent precisely that,187 Although early public policy sometimes encour-
aged wharfing, long-standing precedents in Rhode Island hold that 
coastal filling must be done with the State's permission or acquies-
ISO It would be unfair to Burling to assert that he completely ignores this passage. He 
quotes three sentences from the relevant paragraph, but through the use of ellipses he 
strategically omits the language discussed above. See Burling, supra note 2, at 31 (quoting 
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-30). 
181 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-30. 
1821d. 
1831d. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
186 See Burling, supra note 2, at 27-28. 
187 See New England Naturist Ass'n v. Larsen, 692 F. Supp. 75, 78 (D.R.l. 1988) ('The 
lands between [the high-water] line and the low-water line constitute the intertidal zone 
and are owned by the State of Rhode Island. Under the Rhode Island Constitution, the 
intenidal zone is held, in trust, for the use of the people"); Town of Warren v. Thornton-
Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Rl. 1999) ("the state holds title to all land below the 
high water mark in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of the public") (quoting Greater 
Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 567 A.2d 1038, 1041 (Rl. 1995»; Bailey v. 
Burges, 11 Rl. 330, 331 (1876) ("In this state, at common law, fee of the soil in tide waters 
below high-water mark is in the state."). 
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cence.188 The State's brief on remand sets forth a compelling argu-
ment that the public trust doctrine in Rhode Island precludes Palaz-
zolo from ever having owned a property interest in destroying the 
coastal wetlands that he alleges has been taken.189 
D. The Palazzolo Ruling on the Lucas Per Se Rule 
The clearest victory for government officials in Palazzolo comes in 
the Court's rejection of Palazzolo's per se claim under Lucas. Lucas 
holds that a per se taking may occur where regulation denies a land-
owner all economically viable use of the land.19o Although Palazzolo's 
land was worth at least $200,000191 (more than thirteen times his 
original purchase price of $13,000) ,192 he argued that the challenged 
wetland regulations denied him all economically viable use of the 
property. Alleging that the land would be worth $3,150,000 if he were 
allowed to develop,193 Palazzolo argued that the remaining value, 
roughly six percent of the alleged unregulated value, should not be 
enough to defeat a per se claim under Lucas.194 He also argued that in 
determining whether a regulation denies all economically viable use, 
188 E.g., Thompson v. Sullivan, 148 A.2d 130, 136 (RI. 1959) (stating that coastal filling 
by a yacht club was "contingent upon the yacht club receiving permission from the state"); 
Bailey, 11 RI. at 331 (noting that coastal filling is done "by permission or acquiescence of 
the state"). Even the case Burling cites to support an alleged long-standing tradition of 
coastal filling by private land owners recognizes that such filling is conducted pursuant to 
"a license to him to fill out" from the State. Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Providence & 
Stonington S.S. Co., 12 RI. 348, 355 (1879); see Burling, supra note 2, at 27-28 (citing 
Providence Steam-Engine, 12 R.I. at 363-64). 
189 See State's Memorandum, supra note 82, at 16-25. The Rhode Island Supreme 
Court's recent remand order directs the trial court to make further findings on the public 
trust issue. See Palazzolo v. State ex reL Tavares, 785 A.2d 561, 561 (RI. 2001) (order re-
manding the case to the superior court and directing counsel to submit further memo-
randa). 
190 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-19 (1992). 
191 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 608 (2001). 
192 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 8~297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *1 
(RI. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997) (describing Palazzolo's initial $13,000 investment in the 
property), aff'd on other grounds sub nom Palazzolo v. State ex. reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 
2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 
(2001). 
19! Palm.z.olo, 533 U.S. at 616 (observing that Palazzolo sought $3,150,000 in compensa-
tion, "a figure derived from an appraiser's estimate as to the value of a 74-10t residential 
subdivision") . 
194 Id. at 631 (noting that Palazzolo argued that a per se claim is not defeated "'by the 
simple expedient of leaving a landowner a few crumbs of value'") (quoting Palazzolo's 
brief). 
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the Court should consider whether the regulation allows the owner to 
realize a reasonable return on investment.195 
The Palazzolo Court rejected this argument, stating that "[a] regu-
lation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on an 
18-acre parcel does not leave the property 'economically idle'" under 
Lucas.196 Although the State may not avoid a per se claim under Lucas 
by leaving the landowner with "a token interest," the $200,000 value 
of Palazzolo's parcel defeated his Lucas claim. 197 
Palazzolo also speaks to another important aspect of the Lucas per 
se rule. Plaintiff's counsel argued that for the government to avoid 
application of the Lucas per se rule, a landowner must be able to de-
rive value from the land by developing it.198 On this view, the Lucas 
per se rule applies even where the land retains significant "specula-
tive" value (the value speculators might pay in the hope that the re-
strictions will be lifted), or where a neighboring property owner offers 
to purchase the land to acquire a permanent view shed or a buffer 
zone for adjacent property, or where recreation or other non-
development uses exist and lend value to the land. 
This argument is unpersuasive. The Lucas Court made clear that 
its per se rule turns on remaining value, regardless of its source.199 
Lucas states unequivocally that if land retains as little as five percent of 
its unregulated value, the per se rule does not apply.200 This ruling 
came in response to a hypothetical posed by Justice Stevens in his dis-
sent regarding a landowner whose property is diminished in value 
ninety-five percent.201 In language that could not be clearer, the Lucas 
majority held that "in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss 
[in value] will get nothing" under the Takings Clause because such an 
owner would "not be able to claim the benefit of [the Lucas] categori-
cal formulation. "202 Both the Lucas majority and Justice Stevens in dis-
sent agreed that only "the landowner who suffers a complete elimina-
tion of value" recovers under the per se rule.203 This exchange shows 
that the per se rule is inapplicable where land may be sold for five 
195 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, 2000 WL 1742033, at *37-40, Palazzolo v. Rhode Is-
land, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047). 
196 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631. 
197 [d. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992». 
198 [d. 
199 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
200 Id. at 1019-20 n.S. 
201 See id. 
202 [d. 
2O~ [d. at 1019 n.S (citing Justice Stevens' dissent). 
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percent of its original value, even where the land is unbuildable.204 In 
fact, the Lucas Court expressly reaffirmed the common sense notion 
that the sale of property for value is an economically beneficial use of 
that property.205 Because Lucas's per se rule applies only where regula-
tion denies all beneficial use, it is inapplicable where the owner is able 
to sell the land for value. The inquiry that drives the per se rule is 
value, not the ability to build.206 
Palazzolo confirms that the Lucas per se rule is inapplicable where 
land retains more than nominal value, rejecting Palazzolo's per se 
claim because he "failed to establish a deprivation of all economic 
value .... "207 Indeed, Palazzolo serves as a real-world illustration of the 
exchange between the Lucas majority and dissent regarding the inap-
plicability of the per se rule to a ninety-five percent value loss. In one 
of the first interpretations of Palazzolo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit ruled that Palazzolo reaffirms that no per se taking 
occurs unless regulation leaves land valueless or with only nominal 
value: "The [Palazzolo] Court held that because Mr. Palazzolo retained 
some economic value in the regulated property, the denial of a build-
ing permit in Mr. Palazzolo's case did not constitute a categorical tak-
204 See ill. 
205 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28 (emphasis added) (discussing situations where "the 
property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale"). 
206 Indeed, the critical role of value to the per se rule permeates the entire Lucas opin-
ion. The first paragraph recites the trial court's finding that the challenged development 
ban rendered Mr. Lucas's land "valueless," and it then asks whether the development ban 
effects a taking due to its "dramatic effect on the economic value of Lucas's lots." [d. at 
1007. The Court describes Lucas's complaint as rooted in the government's "complete 
extinguishment of his property's value." [d. at 1009. It characterizes the state supreme 
court's ruling as finding no taking "regardless of the regulation'S effect on the property's 
value." [d. at 1010. In delineating its per se rule, the Lucas opinion once again emphasizes 
the key factual predicate that underlies the per se rule: the trial court's finding that the 
lots had been "rendered valueless" by the regulation at issue. [d. at 1020. The pivotal na-
ture of this finding is evidenced by the majority's specific justification for accepting it, see 
id. at 1020 n.9, as well as the skepticism regarding its accuracy expressed by each of the 
four separate opinions in the case. [d. at 1034 (Kennedy,]., concurring) ("I share the res-
ervations of some of my colleagues about a finding that a beachfront lot loses all value 
because of a development restriction."); id. at 1043-44 (Blackmun,]., dissenting) ("The 
Court creates its new takings jurisprudence based on the trial court's finding that the 
property had lost all economic value. This finding is almost certainly erroneous."); id. at 
1065 n.3 (Stevens,]., dissenting) (the "land is far from 'valueless'"); ill. at 1076 (Souter,]., 
separate statement) (noting the trial court's finding that the development ban rendered 
the land valueless is "highly questionable"). 
207 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001); see also ill. at 652 (Ginsburg, 
Souter & Breyer,lJ., dissenting) (stating that "a floor value was all the State needed to de-
feat Palazzolo's simple Lucas claim "). 
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ing. "208 Tahoe-Sierra, too, confirms that "[a]nything less than a 'com-
plete elimination of value,' or a 'total loss,' ... would require the kind 
of analysis applied in Penn Central. "209 
Palazzolo does not explain precisely what the Court means by "to-
ken" value, which would be insufficient to defeat a Lucas per se claim. 
But because both Palazzolo and Lucas reject the suggestion that a 
ninety-five percent value loss may support a per se claim, Palazzolo's 
assertion regarding token value must refer to truly de minimis value, 
something significantly less than five percent.210 
E. The Palazzolo Dicta on the Parcelras-a-Whole Rule 
In disposing of the Lucas claim, the Court expressly declined to 
address Palazzolo's argument that the wetland portion of his property 
should be considered separately from the upland portion because 
Palazzolo failed to make this argument in the state courts.211 In other 
words, the Court refused Palazzolo's invitation to revisit its prior rul-
ings that a regulation's economic impact should be evaluated by con-
sidering its effect on the claimant's entire parcel,212 
Burling argues that the Court's treatment of this parcel-as-a-
whole rule "has been mixed, hopelessly contradictory, and defiant of 
synthesis,"2111 but he greatly overstates the alleged confusion in the law 
208 See Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. de-
nied, 122 S. Ct. 2260 (2002). 
209 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 
1483 (2002) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012). 
210 See Animas Valley Sand & Gravel v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 38 P.3d 59, 6!H>7 
(Colo. 2001) (en bane) (noting that Palozzolo shows that the Lucas per se rule applies only 
where land is left valueless or with only de minimis value, and that a non-per se taking may 
occur only where regulation leaves a landowner with "a value slightly greater than de 
minimis"). In another instance of exaggeration, Burling asserts that "some commentators 
continue to suggest that Lucas makes it harder for a court to find a taking," citing a publica-
tion that I cO-Quthored as support. Burling, supra note 2, at 60 & n.382 (citing KENDALL, 
DOWLING & ScHWARTZ, supra note 75, at 194-204). The cited publication says no such 
thing. It simply demonstrates that the per se rule under Lucas is driven by value, not by any 
purported right to build. See KENDALL, DOWUNG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 75, at 196-204. 
Far from suggesting that Lucas makes it harder for a court to find a taking, my cO-Quthors 
and I observed that Lucas's treatment of value and the economically~able-use test in this 
regard "reflects the Court's historic understanding of these concepts in takings analysis." 
[d. at 197. TaJwe..Sierra reaffirms that to prevail on a per se taking under Lucas, a landowner 
must show a complete loss of value. TaJwe..Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483 (a claim based on less 
than a total value loss "would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Centraf'). 
211 See Palozzolo, 533 U.S. at 631-32. 
212 See id. 
2U Burling, supra note 2, at 51. 
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on this score. In fact, the parcel-as-a-whole rule is one of the few 
firmly entrenched, bright lines in takings jurisprudence. The Court 
articulated this parcel-as-a-whole rule more than twenty years ago in 
Penn Central. There, the City of New York applied historic preserva-
tion laws to deny the owners of Grand Central Terminal permission to 
build an office building atop the terminal. 214 The Court rejected the 
owners' argument that takings analysis should focus solely on the air 
rights above the terminal, stating: 
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into 
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights 
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In de-
ciding whether a particular governmental action has 
effected a taking, this Court focuses rather ... on the nature 
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a 
whole-here, the city tax block designated as the "landmark 
site."215 
Because the owners could still operate the Terminal and the sur-
rounding contiguous properties that they owned, the challenged 
regulation did not deny them all economically viable use of their en-
tire parcel, and the Court rejected the takings claim.216 
The Court has reaffirmed the parcel-as-whole rule time and 
again.217 The overwhelming majority of lower courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have followed Penn Central and other binding prece-
dent to hold that the relevant parcel for takings analysis consists of at 
214 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137-38 (1978). 
215Id. at 130-31. 
216 Id. at 136-38. 
217 E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-502 (1987) 
(ruling that "the 27 million tons of coal do not constitute a separate segment of property 
for takings law purposes" in a takings challenge to mining restrictions); Andrus v. Allard, 
444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979) ("At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property 
rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate 
must be viewed in its entirety."). The Court in Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. 
Construction Laborers Pension Trust stated: 
[A] claimant's parcel of property [may] not first be divided into what was 
taken and what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the 
former to be complete and hence compensable. To the extent that any por-
tion of property is taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety; the rele-
vant question, however, is whether the property taken is all, or only a portion 
of, the parcel in question. 
508 U.S. 602, 643-44 (1993). 
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least all of the claimant's contiguous property, not just the affected 
portion.218 
In view of this long-standing precedent it is puzzling that Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the Palazzolo Court, would refer to the matter as 
a "difficult, persisting question."219 Although Justice Kennedy cited 
cases applying the rule, he did not describe these cases as holding 
that courts should look to the parcel as a whole, but instead used 
more tepid language, stating that "[s]ome of our cases indicate that 
the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory action is measured 
against the value of the parcel as a whole. "220 Justice Kennedy also 
cited to footnote seven of Lucas for the proposition that the Court "at 
times expressed discomfort with the logic of this rule. "221 He further 
observed that certain commentators have also criticized the parcel-as-
a-whole rule.222 As Burling's article portends, the plaintiff's bar 
probably will use this discussion in an attempt to persuade lower 
courts to abandon the parcel-as-a-whole rule. 
Several responses present themselves. First, the parcel-as-a-whole 
rule is based not on mere "indicat[ions] " as suggested by Justice Ken-
nedy, but instead on long-standing, binding rulings promulgated by 
the Supreme Court, including Concrete Pipe & Products of California, 
Inc. v. Construdion Laborers Pension Trust, a unanimous post-Lucas rul-
218 E.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P'ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 881 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (finding that the relevant parcel includes both the affected and unaffected por-
tions of the owner's parcel); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) ("[T]he quantum of land to be considered is not each individual lot containing wet-
lands or even the combined area of wetlands. If that were true, the Corps' protection of 
wetlands via a permit system would, ipso facto, constitute a taking in every case where it 
exercises its statutory authority."); see Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); City of An-
napolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000, 1022 (Md. 2000) ("[T]he property to be assessed for 
economically viable use is, as we have said, the entire tract of land .... "); K & K Constr., 
Inc. v. Dept. of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Mich. 1998) ("[C]ontiguity and com-
mon ownership create a common thread tying these three parcels together for the pur-
pose of the takings analysis."); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Wis. 1996) 
(finding that the relevant parcel included about 8.2 acres zoned as wetlands and 2.1 acres 
of contiguous property zoned for residential and commercial development); E. Cape May 
Assocs. v. State, Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 693 A.2d 114, 125 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) 
("The majority of out-of-state cases which have considered the [relevant parcel question] 
have held that it consists of all of the claimant's contiguous acreage in the same owner-
ship."). 
219 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001). 
220 [d. (emphasis added). 
221 [d. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992». 
222 [d. (citing Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REv. 
1,16-17 (1987) and John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Tak-
ings Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1535 (1994». 
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ing.223 In her dissent,Justice Ginsburg points out the majority's failure 
to acknowledge Concrete Pipe.224 Burling tries to downplay the 
significance of Concrete Pipe by noting that it did not involve real prop-
erty,225 but Concrete Pipe cites and relies on both Penn Central and Key-
stone, both real property cases, in its reaffirmation of the parcel-as-a-
whole rule.226 
Second, Justice Kennedy'S description of Lucas's footnote seven is 
inaccurate, for footnote seven does not "express discomfort with the 
logic" of the parcel-as-a-whole rule. Indeed, it does not discuss the 
"logic" of the rule at all. Instead, footnote seven observes that the 
deprivation-of-all-economically-feasible-use rule does not, by itself, 
offer guidance on how to define the relevant parcel,227 and it then 
notes that the relevant parcel might be defined by considering either 
the affected portion or the parcel as a whole. Footnote seven then 
expresses disagreement with the particular relevant-parcel definition 
used by the New York Court of Appeals in Penn Central.228 It is note-
worthy that the Lucas Court did not question its own use of the parcel-
as-a-whole rule in its Penn Central ruling. Footnote seven then notes 
that uncertainty regarding the denominator has led to disparate re-
sults on occasion, and it suggests that state law might be relevant to 
the proper definition of the relevant parce1.229 However, footnote 
seven nowhere analyzes, much less criticizes, the "logic" of the parcel-
as-a-whole rule. 
Third, the discussion of the relevant-parcel issue by the Palazzolo 
majority is gratuitous dicta because the Palazzolo Court expressly de-
clined to address the issue. So too is footnote seven of Lucas because, 
as indicated in that footnote, Lucas alleged a taking of his entire par-
ce1.230 . 
223 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 
602,644 (1993). 
224 See Palazzolc, 533 U.S. at 651 n.2 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer,lJ., dissenting) (stating 
that Palazzolo's proposed parcel definition conflicts with "numerous holdings" of the Su-
preme Court, including Concrete Pipe) . 
225 Burling, supra note 2, at 55. 
w; See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 644. 
227 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) ("Regrettably, the rhe-
torical force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its 
precision, since the rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss 
of value is to be measured. "). 
228 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77 (N.Y 1977), afl'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
229 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. 
230 Id. at 1017 n.7. 
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Finally, and most importantly, the Tahoe-Sierra Court resoundingly 
reaffirmed the parcel-as-a-whole rule, setting forth a comprehensive 
discussion of the decades of precedent that support the rule 231 and 
stating that the Court has "consistently rejected" any other ap-
proach.232 The Court rejected both geographic and conceptual sever-
ance, insisting that "[a]n interest in real property is defined by the 
metes and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the 
term of years that describes the temporal aspect of the owner's inter-
est. "233 Even the dissent acknowledges that the majority concludes that 
the parcel-as-a-whole rule is settled law,234 and thus there can be no 
question that Tahoe-Sierra puts to rest any confusion created by Palaz-
zolo regarding the rule. 
CONCLUSION 
State and local officials won a clear victory with a holding that 
significantly cabins the scope of liability under the Lucas per se rule. 
On ripeness, the Court ruled for Palazzolo on the facts but reaffirmed 
its basic ripeness doctrine and the right of state and local officials to 
fashion their land-use procedures as they see fit. On post-enactment 
acquisition, the Court rejected a blanket rule of per se non-liability, 
but it recognized that regulations may serve as background principles 
where they are "derived from" a state's legal tradition. Five Justices re-
affirmed that pre-existing regulations are relevant to the issue of 
whether a non-per se Penn Central taking has occurred. 
The State of Rhode Island is likely to prevail on remand, particu-
larly given the trial court's findings that the proposed fill would con-
stitute a nuisance, the State's compelling argument that the public-
trust doctrine precludes liability, the absence of evidence as to the vi-
ability of Palazzolo's beach club proposal, and the speculative nature 
of Palazzolo's subdivision proposal. Regardless of the outcome on re-
mand, however, Palazzolo stands not as a landmark victory for property 
owners, but instead as yet another modest, incremental development 
in takings jurisprudence, one from which both sides may draw sup-
port. 
m 122 S. Ct. 1465,1481,1483-84 (2002). 
2~2 [d. at 1483. 
2~~ [d. at 1484. 
2M 1d. at 1496 n.* (Thomas & Scalia,jJ., dissenting). 

